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Abstract  
Changes in relationships are due to human actions. We assume that these human actions are 
functions of perceptions of a focal individual, but also the perceptions of other individuals 
who are part of the organizational and social environment. We hypothesize that perceptions 
based trust and perceptions of the structural environment individuals operate in affect 
relationship change more than the "actual" environment in which individuals operate. An 
empirically analysis shows the dynamic effects of perceptions on changes in two types of 
relationships, which are believed to be important in account management. We explore, 1, 
whether the levels of perceptions, and, 2, whether changes in perceptions affect relationship 
changes. For example, we consider the effects of the amount of trust as well as the change in 
the amount of trust one individual puts in another individual. We find that perceptions have 
more impact on relationship change than "actual" network variables have. Furthermore, the 
results show that it is useful to distinguish between level and change effects of perceptions. 
1 Introduction 
Information transfer relationships are crucial for organizations that root their competitive 
advantages in knowledge (re-) combinations (Grant 1996; Hargadon & Sutton 1997). 
Organizations give individuals more autonomy to develop, maintain and dissolve information 
transfer relationships (Galbraith 1994; Volberda 1998). However, little is yet known about 
what drives individuals to change relationships (Burt 2000b; Tsai 2000). We assume that 
relationships change as a function of perception-based  evaluations that individuals make 
about these relationships (cf. Barry & Crant 2000; Heider 1958). In a qualitative study, 
Andrews & Delahaye (2000) find that not only self-perceptions, but also perceptions of others 
may influence information transfers. In our study we empirically explore effects of self-
perceptions and perceptions of others on changes in information requests. 
Andrews & Delahaye (2000) find that perceptions such as, trustworthiness and 
credibility influence information transfers. We suggest these are two perception-based 
dimensions of interpersonal trust (cf. Deutsch 1960; Dooley & Fryxell 1999). Interpersonal 
trust can be seen as an attitude of one individual towards another based on perceptions, 
beliefs, and attributions to that other (Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard & Werner 1998). Trust has 
been found to increase the quality and quantity of information transfers (O'Reilly & Roberts 
1976; Zand 1972). However, trust is a multidimensional concept  that may affect relationship 
evaluation in different ways (e.g. Mayer, Schoorman & Davis 1995; McAllister 1995). 
Indeed, a perceptions-based distinction between trust in intentions and trust in abilities has 
been made (Deutsch 1960; Dooley & Fryxell 1999). Trust in intentions is what Andrews & 
Delahaye (2000) would call trustworthiness. It is the trust that others will not harm your 
interests, for example, by using information you have given to your disadvantage. On the 
other hand, trust in abilities is reflected in the credibility of individuals. Andrews &Delahaye 
(2000) find that individuals attribute the quality of information they might receive to the 
quality of the individual from who they receive it. In the present study we explore the effects 
of these two dimensions, both the perception of an ego that requests information as well as the 
perception of alter that gives information. 
Theories suggest that the organizational and social environment influences individuals 
motivation for action (Heider 1958; March & Simon 1958). The main elements in this 
environment are individuals and the relationships between them, which taken together form a 
network of relationships. Andrews and Delahaye (2000) suggest that perceptions of network 
structures may influence information transfers. Cognitive social structures capture the 
perceptions that individuals have of networks structures (Krackhardt 1987). Indeed, cognitive 
social structures have been shown to influence for example, individual's beliefs (Kilduff & 
Krackhardt 1994), performance (Krackhardt 1990) and friendships (Carley & Krackhardt 
1996). 
If we consider the cognitive social structure of a focal individual, let us call him/her 
ego, we have to realize that the organizational and social environment also consists of other 
perceiving individuals. In case such individuals have a direct relationship with ego we will 
call them alter. Alter's cognitive social structure might lead him/her to be more or less 
accessible for information requests from ego. Hence, whether ego finds it easier or harder to 
get information from alter depends on alter's perceptions. For similar reasons we also consider 
the perceptions of those individuals that are not directly part of a relationship but have a 
relationship with both alter and ego (we call them third parties). We assume that perceptions 
of network structures have an effect on the evaluation individuals make of the relationships in 
which they are involved. 
The context in which information is used may be the decisive factor in an individual’s 
evaluation of a relationship. The literature on information transfer has mainly focussed on the 
context of R&D (e.g. Hansen 1999; Ancona & Caldwell 1992). However, other contexts such 
as account management are also heavily dependent on information transfers. In account 
management the focus is on the creation of tailor-made products and services for important 
customers. Such processes often require the combination of different knowledge bases (Grant 
1996; cf. Henderson & Clark 1989). In this paper we limit the discussion to the context of 
account management in service industries. 
In the following section, we discuss the context of our study in greater detail. 
Subsequently, we discuss our hypotheses in section 3 and the method we use to test these 
hypotheses in section 4. In section 5 we present the results of our analyses, and, in section 6 
we discuss these results and present our conclusions. 
 
2 Account Management In Service Industries 
We define account management as the set of processes involving activities that develop and 
maintain beneficial relationships with important customers. In order to meet the needs of 
different important customers, many organizations have introduced account management 
(Cespedes 1992; Shapiro & Moriarty 1984b). For many service providing organizations, like 
banks, management consultant firms, software engineering companies and advertising 
agencies, it is essential to continuously produce new and tailor–made services. Services that 
these firms offer are often easily replicated or have short life cycles. 
Processes that lead to tailor-made outcomes can be characterized as innovative 
processes, as each customer requires a unique bundle of service attributes. These processes 
are often accompanied by the (re-)combination of different knowledge bases (Grant 1996; 
Kogut & Zander 1995). To create tailor-made services, account managers in service industries 
are often responsible for both the specification of services, and for the delivery of these 
services (Cespedes 1991, p.348; Zeithaml, Berry & Parasuraman 1988). A service 
specification task aims to develop a service proposal that optimally fits and/or anticipates 
customer needs. A service delivery task aims to "produce" and deliver services according to 
the specification that was accepted by a customer.  
The specification and delivery tasks require distinct types of knowledge (Nelson & 
Winter 1982; Ruekert & Walker 1987; Ryle 1949; Simon 1997). In service specification 
tasks, the primary aim is to determine which offering would sufficiently satisfy a customer. 
This task requires knowledge about which bundle of service attributes would best fit a 
customer’s needs. Moreover, this task encompasses the search for information. For example, 
service specification tasks would benefit from "new" knowledge that results from the 
combination of knowledge about different currently available services. On the other hand, in 
service delivery tasks the primary aim is to 'produce' an accepted specification. A central 
aspect is the transfer of knowledge about how to implement bundles of service attributes and 
it requires the integration of specialized skills and routines that provide different service 
attributes (Lawrence & Lorsch 1967; Nelson & Winter 1982). To accomplish both service 
specification and service delivery tasks, individuals usually require the knowledge of others. 
Especially, to generate tailor-made services, knowledge of others is needed. Relationships 
facilitate the search and transfer of information that holds this knowledge (cf. Hansen 1999). 
Therefore any changes in these relationships are a salient issue in account management. 
 3 Relationship Changes 
3.1 The Process of Changing Relationships 
We define the change in a relationship as a change in the strength of a relationship. The 
strength of a relationship is defined as the degree of substantive and affective interaction 
between two individuals (cf. Granovetter 1973; Krackhardt 1992). In this study we focus on 
the change in strength of task-specific information transfer relationships. We assume that 
changes in a relationship are a function of the perceptions ego holds about alters and the 
perceptions of those that form the network of which the relationship between ego and alter is 
a part. This includes alters perceptions as well as perceptions of third parties.  
 This view on relationship change is a constructual perspective that entails that "social 
structure through interaction affects cognition, and cognition motivates interaction and hence 
changes social structure" (Carley & Krackhardt 1996). We especially focus on the effects of 
cognition of social structure on relationship change (and thus social structure change). We do 
not explicitly model the process of cognition, but rather we use Heider’s (1958) balance 
theory to assess how different perceptions would affect ego’s evaluation of alter as a useful 
source for information. A positive (negative) evaluation of alter as a source of information 
implies that ego likes (dislikes) the information alter can provide (cf. Heider 1958, p.140, 
p.174). Based on such evaluations, ego strengthens (weakens) the relationship with alter. 
We further assume that the effects of perceptions on relationship changes are twofold. 
We expect that the ‘level of perceptions’ influence relationship changes. For example, the 
amounts of trust ego puts in alter at a given moment can make ego to change the relationship 
strength. Additionally, we postulate an effect of the ‘change in the level of perception’. This 
effect occurs when ego updates his/her perceptions. For example, Meyerson, Weick & 
Kramer (1996) emphasize that trust can be "swift" trust such as that of the crew of a 
commercial airplane. This crew might never have met, but may need to take-off within an 
hour. This requires the swift development of trust. It is the change in the level of trust which 
makes the crew to take action.  
It should be mentioned that we would expect relationship changes only for ego’s 
perceptions, and not for those of alter or third parties. Heider (1958) suggests that alter's 
perceptions become apparent to ego through alter's actions. Therefore, we do not expect a 
short-term effect of alter's perceptions on ego-induced relationship changes. In fact, actions 
are events that happen in the short-term and we would need to consider an even shorter term 
to measure ego's response to these actions. Although we do not exclude the possibility of 
short-term relationship change based on alter's perceptions, we do not expect it. 
 
3.2 Trust 
Interpersonal trust has been found to enhance the quality of information transfer (O'Reilly & 
Roberts 1976), increase the frequency of information transfer (Zand 1972), and in work 
situations is suggested to be a necessary condition for cooperation (Arrow 1974; Brockner, 
Siegel, Daly, Tyler & Martin 1997). McAllister (1995) defines interpersonal trust as the 
extent to which a person is confident in, and willing to act on the basis of, the words, actions, 
and decisions of another. Interpersonal trust can be seen as an attitude of one individual 
towards another based on perceptions, beliefs, and attributions to that other (Whitener, Brodt, 
Korsgaard & Werner 1998). Hence, trust as an attitude is an aggregate measure of how 
individuals perceive each other. 
We have emphasized in the introduction that we consider two relevant dimensions of 
trust in this study to be perceived abilities and perceived intentions (Deutsch 1960). As we 
mentioned the distinction between these dimensions reflect the perceived trustworthiness and 
credibility that Andrews & Delahaye (2000) found to affect information transfers. Even a 
greater similarity exists with the dimensions Dooley & Fryxell (1999) discern. They 
emphasize the distinction between loyalty and ability as two dimensions of trust, which 
concurs with trust in intentions and trust in abilities.  In the following we suggest that trust of 
ego in alter and the trust of alter in ego might influence information requests. Also we suggest 
that the effects of the dimensions of trust are dependent on the type of information transferred.  
3.2.1 Ego’s Trust in Alter    
In accordance with earlier studies we expect a positive effect of trust on information requests. 
However, we also expect that the "ability" and "intention" dimensions of trust, both have a 
strong influence on service specification or service delivery relationships. When ego works on 
service specification tasks he/she is less vulnerable to adverse intentions of alter who provides 
service specification information. Trust in the abilities of alter suggests that ego perceives 
alter to have the ability to do the right things right. Ego’s evaluation of alter as provider of 
service specification information would be positive in this case, because according to ego, 
alter is likely to know what to do. Therefore, 
 
H1a: The increase in, and the amount of, trust that ego has in alter’s abilities are positively 
related with ego's change in the strength of the service specification relationship with 
alter. 
 
For service delivery information transfer we expect trust in intentions to be more relevant. As 
mentioned above, service delivery tasks aim to implement services. More explicit goals can be 
formulated for these tasks. This also requires explicit commitment of time and energy from 
those participating in the implementation. 
Especially when the services to be delivered are new, it is hard to assess whether skills 
and capabilities of alter are sufficient (Nelson & Winter 1982). Therefore, trust in ability is 
hard to generate and it is less likely that ego initiates actions due to trust in ability. A 
necessary condition for ego to request more service delivery information is that ego trusts 
alter to do his/her best to attain task goals. Ego’s trust in alter's intentions has a positive effect 
on ego’s evaluation whether alter is a good source for service delivery information. Hence, 
 
H1b: The increase in, and the amount of, trust ego has in alter’s intentions are positively 
related with ego’s change in the strength of the service delivery relationship with alter. 
 
3.2.2 Alters' Trust in Ego 
Trust in ego’s abilities indicates that alter perceives ego to be able to accomplish his/her job 
successfully. Alter may perceive that ego might contribute to his/her knowledge and hence be 
more open to information transfers with ego. However, we may derive from attribution theory 
(Heider 1958) that as trust in abilities rises, the more likely it becomes that alter perceives 
himself/herself to be a less useful source for service specification information to ego.  
According to Heider (1958), the abilities of ego to perform tasks are evaluated against, 
for example, performances of others who do similar tasks. High amounts of trust in an ego’s 
abilities might mean that alter attributes to ego higher abilities than to third parties. Now 
assume that ego and alter operate in an similar environment on similar tasks. The more alter 
trusts ego’s abilities, the smaller alter perceives the difference between alter and ego’s 
abilities to be1. Therefore, the more alter trusts ego’s abilities, the less likely it is that he/she 
will consider himself/herself to be a useful source of information for ego. Alter would then be 
less focused on providing ego with information, which negatively affects ego’s evaluation 
about whether alter is a good source for information. This would be especially eminent for 
service specification tasks where the decisions of what to do are made. On the other hand in 
service delivery tasks trust in abilities can be interpreted as a willingness to cooperate in the 
"production" of services. An ego whose abilities are trusted by a specific alter may use this 
alter in the execution of what ego suggests should be done. We therefore hypothesize, 
 
H2a: The increase in, and the amount of, trust alter has in ego’s abilities are negatively and 
positively related with ego’s change in the strength of (1) the service specification 
relationship, and (2) of the service delivery relationship with alter, respectively. 
 
When alter trusts ego’s intentions, alter perceives that ego’s goals or ways to reach a goal are 
congruent with that of him/herself. In order to accomplish such goals, alter is willing to share 
information with ego, that is, both service specification information and service delivery 
information. From ego’s perspective the more effort it takes to access alter’s information, the 
less positive ego will evaluate alter as a source for information. For both service specification 
information requests and service delivery information requests we hypothesize, 
 
H2b: The increase in, and amount of, trust alter has in ego’s intentions are positively related 
with ego’s change in the strength of (1) the service specification relationship, and (2) of 
the service delivery relationship with alter. 
 
                                                 
1 Assuming that alter takes his own abilities as benchmark and substracts ego’s abilities from his/her 
own abilities. 
3.3 Cognitive Social Structure 
As mentioned earlier, perceptions of network structure may affect relationship changes. 
However, most studies on the effect of network structure do not consider these perceptions, 
but only consider "actual" networks. Such studies show that relationships that are embedded 
in dense network structures are more stable than relationships that are not embedded in dense 
networks (Feld 1997; Burt, 2000). Individuals in broker positions maintain relationships with 
two or more unconnected others (e.g. Burt 1992; Fernandez & Gould 1994). As, these 
relationships are not embedded we would expect that these relationships are more prone to 
change. 
Furthermore, the literature on "actual" networks shows that broker positions affect 
individuals’ opportunities to accomplish different tasks (e.g. Burt 1992; Gargiulo & Benassi 
2000). For example, broker positions enhance the ability of individuals to combine 
information for product innovations (Tsai & Ghoshal 1998), which offers them "new" 
information (Hargadon & Sutton 1997). However, brokered relationships are often weaker 
and hence decrease individuals’ ability to transfer complex information (Granovetter 1973; 
Hansen 1999). Also brokers could experience higher information ambiguity, because they 
receive information from unrelated sources (Burt 1997a).  
In our empirical analyses we will control for "actual" broker positions, but we do 
focus on the effects that perceived broker positions have on relationship change. We will 
consider the effects of perceptions that ego, alter and third parties hold of the network 
structure. Again, hypotheses are specified on whether a relationship change concerns a change 
in service specification or service delivery information requests. For similar reasons as we 
have discussed above, we consider change and level effects. 
 
3.3.1 Ego’s Perception of Broker Positions 
In service specification tasks, the aim is to develop services that uniquely satisfy customer 
needs. Information that enhances the scope of possible solutions to be considered might 
contribute to the accomplishment of these tasks. Brokers especially may be a source for such 
information, because they have opportunities to (re-) combine different knowledge bases, 
which stimulates the development of "new" information (Hargadon & Sutton 1997; Tsai & 
Ghoshal 1998). However, as brokers combine unrelated information they are more prone to 
ambiguous information (Burt 1997a). It has been suggested that the use of specific 
information will decrease when that information leads to ambiguity (O’Reilly 1983; Hackman 
1990). Therefore, 
   
H3: The increase in, and the number of times that ego perceives to broker the relationship 
with alter, are negatively related with ego’s change in strength of the (a) service 
specification relationship, and (b) of the service delivery relationship with alter. 
 
If alter brokers the relationship with ego, this could be advantageous for the service 
specification tasks that ego has to accomplish. Recall that service specification aims to 
develop a service that uniquely fits a specific customer’s needs and that "new" information 
might be beneficial to this task. As brokers are expected to have more "new" information 
available we hypothesize, 
 
H4a: The increase in, and the number of times that ego perceives alter to broker the 
relationship with ego, are positively related with ego’s change in strength of the service 
specification relationship with alter. 
 
If ego has to deal with a broker to accomplish a service delivery task, this might be harmful. A 
broker position violates optimal conditions for service delivery tasks, which require focus and 
mutual understanding that allow transfer of more complex knowledge (Ancona & Caldwell 
1992; Hansen 1999). By definition, brokers’ attentions are scattered over unconnected alters, 
which reduces his/her focus and deep mutual understanding. Hence,  
 
H4b: The increase, in and the number of times that ego perceives alter to broker the 
relationship with ego, are negatively related with ego’s change in strength of the service 
delivery relationship with alter. 
 
When ego perceives third parties to broker the relationship between him/her and alter, he/she 
perceives to have a weak relationship with alter. Hansen (1999) suggests that weak 
relationships may obstruct information transfers. Hence, 
 
H5: The increase in, and the number of times that ego perceives third parties to broker the 
relationship between ego and alter, are negatively related with ego’s change in the 
strength of the (a) service specification relationship, and, (b) service delivery 
relationship with alter.  
 
3.3.2 Alters' Perception of Broker Positions 
How would ego respond to alter's perception that alter brokers the relationship? The 
perception of alter that he/she is a broker signals that he/she might have "new" information 
available. This would have a positive influence on ego’s evaluation of alter's suitability to be a 
source for service specification information. However, it would have a negative effect on 
ego’s assessment of alter as a source for service delivery information. Because alter has 
perceived to be a broker he/she will have no incentive to strengthen the relationship with ego. 
To accomplish a service delivery task that ego and alter are both engaged in, ego has to 
compete with third parties for the attention of alter.  We therefore hypothesize, 
 
H6: The number of times that alter perceives to broker the relationship with ego, is  positively 
related with ego’s change in strength of (a) the service specification relationship, and, is 
negatively related with ego’s change in the strength of (b) the service delivery 
relationship with alter. 
 
When alter perceives ego to broker the relationship ego is perceived to be a potential source 
of "new" information for alter. However, it also implies that alter is a source of ambiguous 
information to ego. Given that ego dislikes ambiguous information as suggested by O'Reilly 
(1983), he/she will negatively evaluate alter as a source for information. Hence, 
 
H7: The number of times, that alter perceives to broker the relationship with ego, is 
negatively related with ego’s change in strength of (a) the service specification 
relationship, and, (b) of the service delivery relationship with alter. 
 
Alter's perception that many third parties’ broker the relationship between alter and ego might 
indicate that alter perceives the relationship with ego to be weak. Furthermore, it may lead 
alter to anticipate a decrease in the relationship strength between the third parties and alter. 
Therefore, ego might want to increase the strength of both relationships with alter to secure 
the valuable information alter has to offer. 
 
H8: The number of third parties that alter perceives to broker the relationship between ego 
and alter, is positively related with ego’s change in strength of (a) the service 
specification relationship, and, (b) of the service delivery relationship with alter. 
 
3.3.3 Perceived Brokered Relationships 
In the case of third party perceptions, the perceptions of those who perceive to broker a 
relationship are of special interest. These self-perceived brokers will attribute the ambiguity 
they have to deal with to both individuals in the brokered relationship. To reduce this 
ambiguity, third parties might want to stimulate direct information transfer between ego and 
alter. However, those third parties provide ego with "new" information, which ego will only 
perceive to be useful if it concerns service specification information. If ego attributes the 
"newness" of information that third parties provide to alter, ego will evaluate alter as a good 
source for service specification information, but a bad source for service delivery information. 
This third party effect becomes more likely if more third parties perceive to broker the 
relationship between ego and alter. Hence, 
 
H9: The number of third parties that perceive to broker the relationship between ego and alter, 
is (a) positively related with ego’s change in strength of the service specification 
relationship, and, (b) negatively related with ego’s change in strength of the service 
delivery relationship with alter. 
 
In the next section we describe the methods we used to test these hypotheses. 
 
4 Method 
4.1 Sample 
Over three periods we collected data on relationship changes in an account managers unit in 
an IT consulting firm. The unit was installed 6 months before our first measurement. We were 
allowed to do two subsequent measurements 12 and 16 months after the installation. This unit 
focuses on the telecom industry and each account manager is responsible for one or a few 
accounts in this industry. To receive full cooperation, subjects were approached on an 
individual bases. Further, management promoted cooperation with the study in plenary 
meetings. Each time, data collection took 5 weeks. 
 We observed 146 relationship changes. The unit consisted of 10 account managers. 
Before the second measurement two subjects left the unit. Their replacements were also 
willing to cooperate in the study and the group did not change before the third measurement. 
Hence, instead of 180 relationship changes we measured 146 relationship changes. (Three 
measurements in a group of 10 individuals are two times 90 relationship changes. Since two 
individuals left after the first period the number of relationship changes we could measure 
were 56 between period 1 and 2, and 90 between period 2 and 3, which sums to 146 
relationship changes.) 
 The average age of the participants was 36.4 years and average company tenure was 
5.6 years. All participants had finished higher education. The group of respondents consisted 
of 11 males and 1 female. Most of the account managers (11) in the unit were stationed at the 
same base. However, the daily time spend at the base is relatively low and infrequent as the 
nature of the job forces account managers to travel between different projects at customer 
sites. Most account managers have supervision over a group of consultants who are assigned 
to projects for their customers. Plenary meetings are held regularly to facilitate knowledge 
updates and initiate contacts. Furthermore, individuals are free to start up bilateral contacts 
with other account managers as they see fit. 
 
 
 
4.2 Measurement 
To measure the dependent and independent variables, we developed networks questions (see 
table 1). As measure for relationship strength we used the frequency with which ego requests 
information from alter (Feld 1997; Wasserman & Faust 1997). Questions 1 and 2 measure the 
dependent variables, that is the frequency with which respondents request respectively service 
specification information and service delivery information in the six months prior to the 
questionnaire. As indicated in table 1 (questions 1 and 2), we labeled both types of 
information as respectively ‘product’ and ‘process’ information, which better suited to the 
vocabulary of the respondents. We present respondents a scale with two anchors (very little to 
very much) and ask them to indicate on a line between those anchor's the frequency of 
information requests. We categorized these responses in seven categories of equal distance. In 
contrast, 5-point Likert like scales were presented to measure the different types of trust 
(questions 4 and 5 in table 1). We choose to use different scales to counter respondents’ 
fatigue. 
W
s
q
th
pTable 1: Network Measures 
Network Measure 
Service specification 
Information Transfer 
Product information is information concerning the fit of product combinations in 
an advice, proposal and/or offer. How often on average do you ask the persons in 
the list for product information? 
Service delivery 
Information Transfer 
Process information is information concerning the 'production' of accepted 
advises, proposals and / or offers. How often on average do you ask the persons 
in the list for process information? 
Perceived Cooperation Please indicate in the schedule below, who do you think works together with 
whom in the acquisition of customers and the implementation of projects? 
Trust in Intentions In working together trust plays a role. To what extent do you trust that those 
listed below take into account your interests? 
Trust in Ability In working together trust plays a role. To what extent do you trust upon the 
knowledge, experience and the capabilities of those listed below? 
  e measure perceived cooperation networks similar to Casciaro (1998), but we enforced 
ymmetry to limit the duration of questionnaire (table 1, question 3). Responses to this 
uestion are part of the cognitive social structure matrix xijq. This is a data cube representing 
e cognitive social structure of a network with q individuals. The value of xijq is 1 if q 
erceives a relationship between i and j and 0 otherwise. With xijq we derive the following 
measures for perceived broker positions and perceived brokered relationships. Measure Aij 
represents ego’s perception of how often ego brokers the relationship, 
. Measure B∑ >∀−=
q
iqiijijqiiqiijiij xxxxxA 0, ),1( ij represents ego’s perceptions of how often 
alter brokers the relationship, ∑ >∀−=
q
jqiijiiqijqiiji xxxxx 0, ),1(
0 TijA
T
ijB
ijB
∑ >∀−=
q
jqiiqiijijqiiqiij xxxxxC , ),1(
. Measure Cij represents 
ego’s perceptions of how often third parties broker the relationship between ego and alter, 
. The transposes , and represent alters’ 
perceptions of respectively how often alter and ego and how many third parties broker the 
relationship. Finally, the measure, 
T
ijC
∑ > 0∀−=
q
jqqiqqijqjqqiqqij xxxxxD , ),1( , represents the sum 
of how often third parties perceive to broker the relationship between ego and alter. 
 
 
4.3 Control variables 
Following other studies that use social cognitive structures we control for effects of the 
"actual" network structure (Kilduff & Krackhardt 1994; Krackhardt 1992). We use the local 
aggregated structure (LAS) as proxy for the "actual" network structure (Krackhardt 1987). In 
the LAS a relationship is present when both actors indicate that the relationship exists 
(Krackhardt 1987 1990).  We use the LAS as the basis for the "actual" broker measures of 
ego, alter and third parties, regarding the relationship between ego and alter.  
 
4.4 Models 
We will consider three statistical models for both our dependent variables. The first model is a 
model in which we include perceptions (trust and cognitive social structures) as well as the 
"actual" network structure. To check how much perceptions and the "actual" network 
structure contribute to the explanatory power of this model, we consider two other models, 
that is, one that contains only perception variables, and the other that contains only "actual" 
network data. 
The general specification of the models we consider is an equilibrium-correction (EC) 
specification (Greene 2000), 
 ijttijtijtijtijtij XYXXYY εγρβα +−−+−+=− −−−− ))(1()()( 11,1,,1,,  (1) 
 
where Yij,t -Yij,t-1 is a vector of (n(n-1)(t-1))×1 elements that represents the change in frequency 
with which i requests information from j between time t-1 and t. Furthermore, Xij,t – Xij,t-1 is a 
matrix that contains the changes in k explanatory variables. Thus Yij,t-1 and Xij,t-1 are the 
frequencies of information requests at time t-1 and the level of the explanatory variables at 
time t-1 respectively. Equation (1) states that the change in information request frequency (Yij,t 
-Yij,t-1) is a function of the change in the explanatory variables (Xij,t – Xij,t-1) as well as the 
equilibrium relation between the frequency of information requests and the level of 
explanatory variables (Yij,t-1 – γXij,t-1). In equation (1), β and γ represent the vectors of 
coefficients that respectively represent the effects of "change" and "level" of the explanatory 
variables on change in the dependent variable. 
 The error-correction model is often used in econometric time series analyses, because 
it has various nice features. For example, it explicitly estimates a coefficient ρ-1 which is the 
short-term adjustment of Yij,t -Yij,t-1 to the deviation of the equilibrium relation. Furthermore, it 
specifies explicitly the effects of change in explanatory variables (β) as well as the effects of 
the level of explanatory variables (γ). These latter features are especially useful to test our 
hypotheses. 
 A problem that might arise however, is that network data are prone to structural 
autocorrelation. Structural autocorrelation may occur, for example, because individuals have 
answering bias, meaning that the statements made by an individual are dependent. Or, a 
specific individual may have a certain unobserved trait, which causes dependency between 
statements of others about relationships with that particular individual.  
To take care of structural autocorrelation Krackhardt (1988) proposes the MRQAP 
analysis, which is robust against structural autocorrelation. Though it has not been shown to 
be generally consistent, elsewhere we show that the MRQAP analysis is also useful for the 
EC model (Dekker, Franses & Krackhardt, 2001). The MRQAP analysis is based on 
simulations with random data that have a similar structural autocorrelation structure as the 
data on which the model parameters are estimated. Using the simulation results, an 
assessment can be made whether model parameter estimates are truly significantly different 
from zero or whether they are spurious results that may have been caused by structural 
autocorrelation. 
 A common way to compare nested regression models is to statistically test whether the 
increase in explained variance, usually measured as the increase in R2, differs from zero. 
Because we use the MRQAP approach, and thus assume that certain assumptions of ordinary 
least squares (OLS) do not hold, we cannot straightforwardly test the changes in the R2-
statistic. However, we may use the adjusted-R2 as a qualitative measure to compare models. 
The adjusted R2 is not sensitive to the number of variables included in the regression and 
therefore a nice measure to compare different regression models. Although we cannot 
interpret the size of the adjusted R2, we may use it to make qualitative statements about the 
differences between adjusted R2 's of nested models. 
  
5 Results 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the levels of the variables. Table 3 and 4 describe the 
results of our analysis. Let us emphasize that we adopt a lenient α=0.10 level of significance 
to test the hypotheses in this explorative study. In table 5, we summarize our results and the 
hypotheses we have formulated in section 3. In this section we will first report on our 
qualitative assessment of the adjusted R2 's of the different nested models. Subsequently, we 
report the results concerning our hypotheses based on the 'best' models. 
Table 5 shows that most of our hypotheses are supported by our estimation results, 
and that the distinction between change and level effects thus seems useful. In table 3 and 4 
we distinguish between change and level parameters respectively by the ∆ and t-1 indices 
attached to the variable names. Indeed, no change effects are found for alter's and third 
parties' perceptions. However, most effects of the perceptions that ego holds are 
distinguishable in level and change effects. 
The adjusted R2's in table 3 shows that adding the "actual" network variables do not 
add explanatory power to the model that describes changes in frequency of service 
specification information. The "actual" network variables do have explanatory power (all 
level variables are significant in model 1c). However the adjusted R2 of model 1c is 
considerably lower than that of model 1a that contains both "actual" network variables as well 
as perception variables. Furthermore, when dropping the "actual" network variables, the 
adjusted R2 increases to .58 (model 1b). With regard to changes in the frequency of service 
specification requests the results suggest that we can disregard the "actual" network variables. 
Hence, we use model 1b to discuss the support for our hypotheses on change in service 
specification relationship strength. 
 The adjusted R2's in table 4 suggest that adding "actual" network variables may add 
some explanatory power to the model for service delivery relationships. Especially, we see 
that the effect of alter's "actual" broker position ("# of times Alter brokers R∆ (LAS)") 
remains present in model 2a. Table 4 also shows that the short-term adjustment parameter (ρ-
1) in model 2b is not significant at α<.10 (-.85, p=0.10), which implies that model 2b that 
incorporates only perception variables is invalid. Therefore we use model 2a for inference on 
our hypotheses concerning service delivery relationship strength. 
 The results partly support hypothesis 1a, on the effects of "Ego's Trust in Alter's 
Abilities" on change in frequency with which alter requests service specification information 
(∆: .33, p= .08 and t-1: .53, p= .15, see table 3 model 1b). Full support is found in model 2a 
for hypothesis 1b on the effects of "Ego's Trust in Alter's Intentions" on change in frequency 
of service delivery information requests (∆: .51, p= .01 and t-1: .96, p= .00). Hence, both 
models 1b and 2a suggests the existence of a "swift" trust effect, since the change parameters 
are significant. 
 Table 3 and 4 also show support for hypotheses 2a1 and 2a2. The level of "Alter's 
Trust in Ego's Abilities", affects ego's change in the frequency with which he/she requests 
information. As expected a negative effect was found for change in service specification 
information (t-1: -.61, p= .09, see table 3, model 1b), and a positive effect was found for 
service delivery information (t-1: .70, p= .01, see table 4, model 2a). Also, model 1b in table 3 
shows support for hypothesis 2b1 since in this model the level of "Alter's Trust in Ego's 
Intentions" is significantly positive (t-1: .69, p= .05). On the other hand hypothesis 2b2 is not 
supported, since the parameter for the level of "Alter's Trust in Ego's Intentions" is not 
significant in model 2a in table 4 (t-1: -.11, p= .33).  
 Broker positions in ego's social cognitive structures do have different effects on 
change in frequency of service specification and service delivery requests. Service 
specification is only affected by "the number of times Ego brokers " the relationship, while 
service delivery is only affected by "the number of times Alter brokers " the relationship, both 
from ego's perception (EP). These findings partly support hypothesis H3a (∆: -.27, p= .11 and 
t-1: -.62, p= .06 see model 1b in table 3) and hypothesis H4b (-.17, p=.17 and -.85, p=.00 see 
model 2a in table 4). Ego's perceptions of "the number of Third Parties that Broker" the 
relationship between ego and alter have an effect only on the change in service delivery 
requests. These results support hypothesis H5b (∆: -.39, p= .02 and t-1: -.65, p= .02, see 
model 2a in table 4) and do not support hypothesis H5a (∆: -.10, p= .24 and t-1: -.49, p= .12, 
see model 1b in table 3).   
  As mentioned, our expectations to only find level effects and no change effects of 
alter's perceptions are supported. However, the support about alter's perceptions is limited to 
alter's perceived broker position. The "number of times that Alter perceives to broker" the 
relationship between ego and alter is positively associated with both ego's change in service 
specification and service delivery information requests. These results support hypothesis H6a 
and H6b (t-1: .51, p= .09 and t-1: .54, p= .05; in respectively table 3 model 1b and table 4 
model 2a). No effects were found of alter’s perceptions concerning the number of times ego 
brokers the relationship or third parties broker the relationship. Hence, no support was found 
for hypotheses H7a, H7b, H8a and H8b. Finally, the number of third parties' that perceive to 
broker the relationship between ego and alter have no effect on the change in information 
requests. No support was found for either hypothesis H9a or for hypothesis H9b.  
 
Table 2: Correlations Between All Variables At t And t-1 
No. Variable Name Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
1 Freq. Serv. Delivery Info. Requestt 1.98 2.28                
2 
-.15
Freq. Serv. Delivery Info. Requestt-1 2.
26 
0 12 47               
              
             
            
           
          
         
        
       
      
     
    
   
  
8 2
# of Third Parties that broker Rt-1 (TPP) 
.
.70
.
1.04
3 
-.12
Freq. Serv. Specification Info. Requestt 2.15
27 
2.28
# of times Ego brokers Rt (LAS) 
.39
.34
.16
.77
4 
.13
Freq. Serv. Specification Info. Requestt-1 2.60
28 
2.28
# of times Ego brokers Rt (LAS) 
.42
.52
.62
.96
.28
.07
5 
.22
Ego’s Trust In Alter’s Intentionst 3.10
29 
1.32
# of times Alter brokers Rt (LAS) 
.47
.34
.40
.77
.31
.17
.42
.24
6 
.11
Ego’s Trust In Alter’s Intentionst-1 3.26
30 
1.29
# of times Alter brokers Rt-1 (LAS) 
.42
.52
.39
.96
.46
.24
.45
.26
.48
.14
7 
.42
Ego’s Trust In Alter’s Abilitiest 3.09
31 
1.32
# of Third Parties that Broker Rt (LAS) 
.32
.32
.50
.60
.33
-.09
.55
.08
.64
.04
.28
.05
8 
-.10
Ego’s Trust In Alter’s Abilitiest-1 3.49
32 
1.04
# of Third Parties that Broker Rt-1 (LAS) 
.29
.51
.41
.76
.39
-.08
.52
-.22
.46
-.18
.46
-.06
.54
-.09
9 
-.24
Alter's Trust In Ego’s Intentionst 3.10
1.12 .08 .10 .04 .12 .06 .03 .14 .08 .13 .08 .05 .17 .11 .15 .01
23 # of times Third Parties broker Rt (AP)  .57 1.15 -.14 -.06 -.21 -.08 -.03 -.21 .02 -.05 -.08 -.08 -.06 -.05 -.10 -.15 -.03 -.20
24 # of times Third Parties broker Rt-1 (AP) .65 1.27 -.17 -.20 -.22 -.18 -.24 -.08 -.14 -.06 -.21 -.20 -.23 -.27 -.15 -.08 -.14 -.05
25 # of Third Parties that broker Rt (TPP) .74 -.08 .08 -.11 -.08 .04 -.16 .01 -.07 .04 -.16 .01 -.07 -.13 -.07 .01
1.01 -.08 -.03 -.05 .03 -.01 -.07 .06 .00 -.01 -.07 .06 .00 -.10 -.17 .06
.15 .13 .27 .24 .11 .13 .22 .12 .13 .13 .24 .10 .60 .33 .17
.14 .24 .10 .12 .20 .18 .14 .23 .18 .20 .18 .26 .54 .06
.22 .21 .13 .13 .24 .10 .11 .13 .22 .12 .29 .14 .37
.16 .23 .18 .20 .18 .12 .20 .18 .14 .07 .26 .19
.06 -.10 .08 -.01 .06 -.10 .08 -.01 -.08 .06 -.05
-.11 -.11 -.12 -.09 -.11 -.11 -.12 -.18 -.33 -.12
1.32 .30 .35 .26 .28 .20 .26 .14 .24
10 Alter's Trust In Ego’s Intentionst-1 3.26 1.29 .26 .26 .17 .23 .26 .31 .21 .18 .48
11 Alter’s Trust In Ego’s Abilitiest 3.09 1.32 .32 .21 .27 .27 .14 .21 .08 .10 .64 .28
12 Alter’s Trust In Ego’s Abilitiest-1 3.49 1.04 .34 .08 .22 .18 .24 .18 .10 .08 .46 .46 .54
13 # of times Ego brokers Rt (EP)  .71 1.24 .14 .06 .42 .27 .14 .17 .24 .20 .09 .09 .18 .10
14 # of times Ego brokers Rt-1 (EP) .93 1.28 .15 .17 .27 .31 .15 .16 .29 .22 .13 .21 .20 .13 .40
15 # of times Alter brokers Rt (EP) .61 1.28 -.03 -.05 .07 -.04 .00 -.02 .06 -.01 -.02 -.06 .13 .04 .16 .08
16 # of times Alter brokers Rt-1 (EP) .68 1.12 -.09 .07 -.02 .07 .13 .08 .08 .05 .06 .03 .14 .08 -.03 .09 .18 
17 # of Third Parties that broker Rt (EP)  .57 1.15 -.19 -.11 .04 -.16 -.08 -.08 -.06 -.05 -.03 -.21 .02 -.05 -.29 -.10 -.24 -.07
18 # of Third Parties that broker Rt-1 (EP)  .65 1.27 -.17 -.24 -.26 -.14 -.21 -.20 -.23 -.27 -.24 -.08 -.14 -.06 -.12 -.37 -.08 -.31
19 # of times Alter brokers Rt (AP) .71 1.24 .22 .20 .16 .29 .09 .09 .18 .10 .14 .17 .24 .20 .07 .17 .20 .17
20 # of times Alter brokers Rt-1 (AP) .93 1.28 .32 .38 .32 .27 .13 .21 .20 .13 .15 .16 .29 .22 .17 .15 .16 .11
21 # of times Ego brokers Rt (AP)  .61 1.28 .00 .12 .07 .22 -.02 -.06 .13 .04 .00 -.02 .06 -.01 .20 .16 .07 .15
22 # of times Ego brokers Rt-1 (AP) .68 .08
  
Table 2: Correlations (Continued) 
No.Variable Name (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) 
18 # of times Third Parties broker Rt-1 (EP) .05              
19 # of times Alter brokers Rt (AP) -.10 15             
15 08 40            
03 .14 16 08           
          
         
        
       
      
     
     
    
   
  
  
-.
.20 # of times Alter brokers Rt-1 (AP) -. - .
21 # of times Ego brokers Rt (AP)  -. - . .
22 # of times Ego brokers Rt-1 (AP) -.20 -.05 -.03 .09 .18
23 # of times Third Parties broker Rt (AP) .12 .08 -.29 -.10 -.24 -.07
24 # of times Third Parties broker Rt-1 (AP) .08 -.01 -.12 -.37 -.08 -.31 .05
25 # of Third Parties that broker Rt (TPP) .25 .09 -.13 -.07 .01 -.15 .25 .09
26 # of Third Parties that broker Rt-1 (TPP) .25 .12 -.10 -.17 .06 -.12
 
.25 .12 .38
27 # of times Ego brokers Rt (LAS) -.22 -.19 .29 .14 .37 .11 -.22 -.16 -.12 -.20
28 # of times Ego brokers Rt (LAS) -.17 -.28 .07 .26 .19 .42 -.19 -.28 -.11 -.25 .36
29 # of times Alter brokers Rt (LAS) -.22 -.16 .60 .33 .17 .13 -.22 -.19 -.12 -.20 .60 .19
30 # of times Alter brokers Rt-1 (LAS) -.19 -.28 .26 .54 .06 .22 -.17 -.28 -.11 -.25 .19 .46 .36
31 # of Third Parties that Broker Rt (LAS) .28 -.06 -.08 .06 -.05 -.10 .28 -.06 .37 .30 -.24 -.12 -.24 -.12
32 # of Third Parties that Broker Rt-1 (LAS) .21 .25 -.18 -.33 -.12 -.24 .21 .25 .08 .34 -.23 -.36 -.23 -.36 .01
Abbreviations: Rt=Relationship between Alter and Ego at time t; EP=Ego’s Perception ; AP=Alter’s Perception ; TPP=Third Parties 
Perceptions ; LAS= Local Aggregated Structure 
 
Table 3: Change in Frequency Service Specification Information Requests 
 
Model 1a Model 1b 
 
Model 1c 
.20     -.40 .76 .24
          
Adj. R2  
 
.57   .58    .39  
I are parameter estimates; II are proportion of simulated parameters larger than given parameter; III are 
proportion of simulated parameters smaller than given parameter. MRQAP analysis based on 10000 simulations. 
Results in Bold are significant at 10% level in MRQAP-analysis. 
Abbreviations: R=Relationship between Alter and Ego; t-1 indicates level effect; ∆ indicates change effects; 
EP=Ego’s Perception ; AP=Alter’s Perception ; TPP=Third Parties Perceptions ; LAS= Local Aggregated Structure 
 
Independent  Variables I II III I II III  I II III 
Constant -.03 .91 .09 -.29 .94 .06 .64 1.00 .00
Short-Term Adjustment  Parameter (ρ-1) -.58 .00 1.00 -.60 .00 1.00 -.45 .00 1.00
        
Ego’s Trust In Alter’s Intentions∆ .04 .48 .52 .01 .52 .48    
Ego’s Trust In Alter’s Intentionst-1 .23 .29 .71 .21 .29 .71    
Ego’s Trust In Alter’s Abilities∆ .28 .12 .88 .33 .08 .92    
Ego’s Trust In Alter’s Abilitiest-1 .45 .20 .80 .53 .15 .85    
Alter's Trust In Ego’s Intentions∆ .31 .09 .91 .29 .10 .90    
Alter's Trust In Ego’s Intentionst-1 .76 .04 .96 .69 .05 .95    
Alter’s Trust In Ego’s Abilities∆ -.04 .58 .42 -.02 .56 .44    
Alter’s Trust In Ego’s Abilitiest-1 -.67 .93 .08 -.61 .91 .09    
        
# of times Ego brokers R∆ (EP)  -.31 .87 .13 -.27 .89 .11    
# of times Ego brokers Rt-1 (EP) -.64 .89 .11 -.62 .94 .06    
# of times Alter brokers R∆ (EP) -.13 .79 .21 -.07 .72 .28    
# of times Alter brokers Rt-1 (EP) -.27 .71 .29 -.19 .66 .34    
# of times Third Parties broker R∆ (EP)  -.07 .66 .34 -.10 .74 .26    
# of times Third Parties broker Rt-1 (EP)  -.40 .82 .18 -.49 .88 .12    
# of times Alter brokers R∆ (AP) -.27 .89 .11 -.11 .75 .25    
# of times Alter brokers Rt-1 (AP) .25 .28 .72 .51 .09 .91    
# of times Ego brokers R∆ (AP)  .02 .47 .53 .02 .49 .51    
# of times Ego brokers Rt-1 (AP) -.04 .50 .50 .02 .44 .56    
# of times Third Parties broker R∆ (AP)  -.03 .61 .39 -.06 .68 .32    
# of times Third Parties broker Rt-1 (AP)  -.12 .63 .37 -.20 .70 .30    
        
# of Third Parties that broker R∆ (TPP) .38 .15 .85 .44 .11 .89    
# of Third Parties that broker Rt-1 (TPP) .68 .19 .81 .57 .22 .78    
        
“Actual” -variables        
# of times Ego brokers R∆ (LAS) -.10 .68 .32  -.39 .92 .08
# of times Ego brokers Rt-1 (LAS) -.26 .68 .32  -.77 .86 .14
# of times Alter brokers R∆ (LAS) .50 .16 .84     .40 .16 .84
# of times Alter brokers Rt-1 (LAS) .71 .22 .78     1.32 .06 .94
# of Third Parties that Broker R∆ (LAS) -.07 .65 .35     .22 .47 .53
# of Third Parties that Broker Rt-1 (LAS) -.73 .80
 
Table 4: Change in Frequency Service Delivery Information Requests 
  Model 2a  Model 2b   Model 2c 
.61 .39 -.04 .54 .46     
Alter's Trust In Ego’s Intentions∆ .10 .33 .67 .02 .47 .53     
Alter's Trust In Ego’s Intentionst-1 -.11 .67 .33 -.11 .62 .38     
Alter’s Trust In Ego’s Abilities∆ .24 .16 .84 .30 .09 .91     
Alter’s Trust In Ego’s Abilitiest-1 .70 .01 .99 .66 .04 .96     
          
# of times Ego brokers R∆ (EP)  -.30 .89 .11 -.21 .80 .20     
# of times Ego brokers Rt-1 (EP) -.16 .70 .30 -.28 .79 .21     
# of times Alter brokers R∆ (EP) -.17 .83 .17 -.17 .81 .19     
# of times Alter brokers Rt-1 (EP) -.85 1.00 .00 -.76 1.00 .00     
# of times Third Parties broker R∆ (EP)  -.39 .98 .02 -.38 .98 .02     
# of times Third Parties broker Rt-1 (EP)  -.65 .99 .01 -.60 .97 .03     
# of times Alter brokers R∆ (AP) .17 .27 .73 .12 .28 .72     
# of times Alter brokers Rt-1 (AP) .54 .05 .95 .47 .06 .94     
# of times Ego brokers R∆ (AP)  .00 .49 .51 .01 .46 .54     
# of times Ego brokers Rt-1 (AP) .27 .14 .86 .09 .36 .64     
# of times Third Parties broker R∆ (AP)  -.07 .63 .37 -.11 .72 .28     
# of times Third Parties broker Rt-1 (AP)  -.02 .53 .47 .02 .48 .52     
           
# of Third Parties that broker R∆ (TPP) .05 .44 .56 -.09 .60 .40     
# of Third Parties that broker Rt-1 (TPP) .04 .46 .54 -.12 .62 .38     
        
“Actual”-variables        
# of times Ego brokers R∆ (LAS) .46 .11 .89   .16 .36 .64
# of times Ego brokers Rt-1  (LAS) -.27 .70 .30   -.39 .72 .28
# of times Alter brokers R∆ (LAS) -.53 .92 .08   -.08 .60 .40
# of times Alter brokers Rt-1 (LAS) -.09 .58 .42   .91 .08 .92
# of Third Parties that Broker R∆ (LAS) -.48 .87 .13   -.34 .81 .19
# of Third Parties that Broker Rt-1 (LAS) -.37 .69 .31  -.42 .68 .32
           
Adj. R2  
 
.42   .39    .22  
I are parameter estimates; II are proportion of simulated parameters larger than given parameter; III are 
proportion of simulated parameters smaller than given parameter. MRQAP analysis based on 10000 simulations. 
Results in Bold are significant at 10% level in MRQAP-analysis. 
Abbreviations: R=Relationship between Alter and Ego; t-1 indicates level effect; ∆ indicates change effects; 
EP=Ego’s Perception ; AP=Alter’s Perception ; TPP=Third Parties Perceptions ; LAS= Local Aggregated Structure 
 
Independent  Variables I II III I II III  I II III 
Constant -1.66 .99 .01 -1.68 .99 .01  1.04 .96 .04
Short-Term Adjustment  Parameter (ρ-1) -.80 .05 .95 -.85 .13 .87  -.60 .00 1.00
          
Ego’s Trust In Alter’s Intentions∆ .51 .01 .99 .59 .01 .99     
Ego’s Trust In Alter’s Intentionst-1 .96 .00 1.00 .94 .00 1.00     
Ego’s Trust In Alter’s Abilities∆ .07 .37 .63 .02 .47 .53     
Ego’s Trust In Alter’s Abilitiest-1 -.08
 
Table 5: Hypotheses and Results based on Model 1b and Model 2a    
Hypotheses 
Support 
for Change  
Effect 
Support 
for Level 
Effect 
Ego’s trust 
H1a: The increase in, and the amount of, trust that ego has in alter’s abilities are positively 
related with ego's change in the strength of the service specification relationship with alter. 
H1a: Yes H1a: No 
H1b: The increase in, and the amount of, trust ego has in alter’s intentions are positively 
related with ego’s change in the strength of the service delivery relationship with alter. 
 
H1b: Yes H1b: Yes 
Alter’s trust 
H2a: The increase in, and the amount of, trust alter has in ego’s abilities are negatively 
related with ego’s change in the strength of (1) the service specification relationship, and 
(2) of the service delivery relationship with alter. 
 
─ 
H2a1: Yes 
H2a2: Yes 
H2b: The increase in, and amount of, trust alter has in ego’s intentions are positively 
related with ego’s change in the strength of (1) the service specification relationship, and 
(2) of the service delivery relationship with alter. 
 
─ 
H2b1: Yes 
H2b2:  No 
Ego’s Perceptions of Broker Positions 
H3: The increase in, and the number of times that ego perceives to broker the relationship 
with alter, are negatively related with ego’s change in strength of the (a) service 
specification relationship, and (b) of the service delivery relationship with alter. 
 
H3a: No 
H3b: No 
H3a:Yes 
H3b: No 
H4a: The increase in, and the number of times that ego perceives alter to broker the 
relationship with ego, are positively related with ego’s change in strength of the service 
specification relationship with alter. 
 
H4a: No 
 
H4a:  No 
 
H4b: The increase, in and the number of times that ego perceives alter to broker the 
relationship with ego, are negatively related with ego’s change in strength of the service 
delivery relationship with alter. 
 
H4b: No H4b: Yes 
H5: The increase in, and the number of times that ego perceives third parties to broker the 
relationship between ego and alter, are negatively related with ego’s change in the strength 
of the (a) service specification relationship, and, (b) service delivery relationship with alter.  
 
H5a: No 
H5b: No 
H5a: Yes 
H5b: Yes 
Alter’s Perceptions of Broker Positions 
H6: The number of times that alter perceives to broker the relationship with ego, is  
positively related with ego’s change in strength of (a) the service specification relationship, 
and, (b) of the service delivery relationship with alter. 
 
─ 
H6a: Yes 
H6b: Yes 
H7: The number of times, that alter perceives to broker the relationship with ego, is 
negatively related with ego’s change in strength of (a) the service specification 
relationship, and, (b) of the service delivery relationship with alter. 
 
─ 
H7a: No 
H7b: No 
Third Parties Perceptions of Broker Positions 
H8: The number of third parties that alter perceives to broker the relationship between ego 
and alter, is positively related with ego’s change in strength of (a) the service specification 
relationship, and, (b) of the service delivery relationship with alter. 
 
─ 
H8a: No 
H8b: No 
H9: The number of third parties that perceive to broker the relationship between ego and 
alter, is (a) positively related with ego’s change in strength of the service specification 
relationship, and, (b) negatively related with ego’s change in strength of the service 
delivery relationship with alter. 
 
─ 
H9a: No 
H9b: No 
─ indicates that no hypothesis is formulated for this effect. 
6 Discussion and Conclusions 
Two findings stand out in this explorative study. First, the results suggest that perceptions do 
matter more than "actual" structure in explaining autonomous relationship development. These 
results are support the qualitative findings of Andrews & Delahaye (2000) that emphasize the 
importance of perceptions for relationship development. Indeed, changes in service delivery 
information requests are affected by the "actual" structure when perception variables are 
introduced, but the contribution to the adjusted R2 is relatively small compared to that of the 
perception variables. Furthermore, the effects of "actual" variables on change in service 
specification information requests disappear after adding the perception variables. These findings 
stress the importance of social cognitive structures (Krackhardt 1987; Carley & Krackhardt 
1996). As we argue, it is not only ego's perception of the organizational and social environment 
that affects ego's behavior, also the perceptions of alters influence ego's behavior. We could not 
find support for the notion that third parties influence ego’s behavior, though this might well be 
due to the relatively small data set. 
 An initially puzzling result is that we see an effect of alter’s "actual" broker position on 
change in service delivery information requests and not on service specification information 
request. A possible explanation could be that the results of service delivery are immediate and 
more objective. The consequences of "actual" positions are more easily associated with this 
performance, while this link is harder to make with service specification. This idea is supported 
by the fact that the effect of  "actual" broker positions is a change effect. When an alter increases 
the number of relations which he/she brokers, this is a signal for ego to diminish service delivery 
information request. Either alter is spending less time on ego or offers more "new" information, 
both negative for accomplishing a service delivery task.    
A second important finding is that the effects of perceptions may not be entirely positive. 
Change in perceptions and the level of perceptions are found to have different effects. These 
latter findings are consistent with ideas about 'swift' trust (Meyerson et al. 1996). Interesting is 
also that individuals do only respond to the level of perceptions of alter. We have to assume that 
this is because we would need more time periods to observe change effects. Another explanation 
is that others are able to hide their change in perceptions or that ego is not able to detect these 
changes in others perceptions. 
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  In this section we subsequently discuss our results in greater detail. First, we focus on the 
outcomes regarding trust. Second, we discuss the concerning cognitive social structures. Finally, 
we discuss some shortcomings of this study and opportunities for further research. 
  
6.1 Trust 
Our results indicate that it makes good sense to distinguish between trust in abilities and trust in 
intentions as two separate dimensions of trust. Each enhances different types of information 
requests in different ways. The fact that usually service specification tasks precede service 
delivery tasks suggests that working relationships first need trust in abilities to start, and 
subsequently need trust in intentions to be finished. However it is not the amount of trust in 
abilities that strengthens the service specification information requests, rather it is the change in 
this amount. Only when trust in alter’s abilities rises will ego request more service specification 
information. 
Also, contrary to standard beliefs about trust we found that trust indeed may diminish 
information transfers. When alter trusts ego’s abilities, ego will decrease the frequency of service 
specification information requests. Together with the relationship enhancement effect of ego's 
trust in alter, there seems to be a process driven by trust that could lead to broker positions in a 
network. When ego receives more trust this apparently implies two things. First, ego diminishes 
his/her relationship strength with others and hence has resources left to engage in relationships 
with others. And, second, as alter trusts ego, alter increases relationship strength with ego and 
hence has less resources to spend on others. These two effects of trust in ego may force ego in a 
broker position. Further research is needed to investigate this idea, but it could be a trust-based 
explanation for the rise of broker positions (see for example, Burt 1992, 1999 for discussions on 
this topic). 
 Another result is that alter's level of trust affect ego's behavior (relationship changes), 
while change in alter’s trust has no effect. Of course the time lag could be the cause of this result 
and we would need shorter time periods to see ego’s reaction to changes in alter’s trust.  Another 
reasoning could be that ego is capable of detecting alter’s levels of trust, though not the change in 
trust. Ego could take alter’s trust in him/her as a given and act on it only to later find out that the 
level of trust has changed. This is a point that needs further research.  
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 6.2 Cognitive Social Structure 
We find that the cognitive social structure affects whether individuals strengthen or weaken their 
relationships. Again remarkable differences between service specification and service delivery 
relationships become apparent. We discuss these effects and differences from two perspectives, 
ego as broker and alter as broker. 
 
6.2.1 Ego as Broker 
The results suggest that individuals do not like to be brokers, even when a broker position means 
that ego is better able to accomplish certain tasks, such as service specification tasks. Apparently 
the (psychological) costs of information ambiguity cannot be retrieved by the advantages broker 
positions offer. This could be because within a cooperative setting, such as within organizations, 
broker positions cannot be exploited. Especially, when costs are relatively hard to share (e.g. 
understanding tacit service delivery information) and advantages are relatively easy to share (e.g. 
transferring "new" service specification information). Especially, when imputation of 
organizational outcome is not directly related to the individual in the broker position.  
In our case, service specification tasks are necessary to execute service delivery tasks, but 
only the latter directly generate financial results. In cooperative settings a common norm is that it 
is expected of individuals to help colleagues. For example, in our study account managers are 
stimulated to share ideas for new products. However, although brokers may provide great input 
for knowledge creation they might be less involved in implementing these ideas. Hence, it is not 
unlikely that credits for the results are assigned relatively less to those that father the idea, then 
those that mother the idea. Broker positions in cooperative settings do bring costs, but it might be 
hard to get credits for the value added due to this position.         
 
6.2.2 Alter as Broker 
Although individuals seem not to like broker positions, under some conditions they recognize the 
value of others in a broker position. With regard to service delivery we find a contradictory effect 
between ego's perceptions, alter's perceptions and the "actual" network. For service delivery tasks 
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it seems that enhancing relationships with a broker is detrimental. "New" information does not 
speed up service delivery. Ego's perception level of alter holding a broker position negatively 
affects the development of relationship strength. Also, alter's "actual" increase in his/her broker 
position is negatively related to change in relationship strength. However, alter's perceptions of 
his/her broker position affects change in service delivery strength positively.  
This finding may be related to the finding that when alter perceives to be a broker he/she 
is a good source for service specification information. Though this result is not significant. Again, 
notice that service specification only generates revenues after a correct service delivery task. 
These tasks depend on strong relationships that allow the transfer of more tacit knowledge (cf. 
Hansen 1999; Nelson & Winter 1982). Hence, because alter's perception to broker the 
relationship is valuable to ego in service specification it also forces ego to strengthen the service 
delivery relationship with alter to overcome what is known as "the knowing-doing gap" (Pfeffer 
& Sutton 2000). This would explain the increase of ego’s effort to strengthen his/her relationship 
with alter, when alter perceives to hold a broker position.  
 
6.3 Limitations and Further Research 
There are obvious limitations to this study. First, the results are evaluated at α=.10. We are 
confident that this is fine for an explorative study as presented here, but we should be cautious 
not to over-generalize the results. Results could be more significant if data would be collected 
over a larger number of periods and/or in a larger number of units with perhaps more individuals. 
Also other contexts could be considered.   
Also many of our results could form bases for new hypotheses that include antecedents of 
perceptions. Especially, structural antecedents would be of interest because then the dynamics of 
the social system could be made more transparant. Simulation studies could be especially 
valuable, for example to analyze the effects of different begin states of networks. These studies 
could enable managers to use tools like empowerment in a more detailed way. Also, these studies 
could make a link between impression management and the evolution of network structures. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
In this paper we showed that perceptions have an important impact on the development of 
relationships. Although "actual" network structures may drive relationship change, trust and 
social cognitive structures seem to have a more important impact on relationship change. The use 
of trust and social cognitive structures (especially cognitive broker positions) make clear two 
things. First, a distinction between trust in intentions and trust in abilities is necessary when we 
analyze changes in different types of information transfers. Second, for both trust and social 
cognitive structures it is important to distinguish between effects of perceived levels as well as 
change in perception. The amount of trust has a different effect than the change in the amount of 
trust that individuals hold. Through structural antecedents of perceptions, future research could 
explicitly link individuals positions and perceptions to network structure evolution. 
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